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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH CIRCUIT
ACME INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellant,
v. No. 88-1001
NATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR THE PROTECTION
OF THE ENVIRONMENT,
Appellee,
V.
STATE OF NEW UNION, Intervenor.
JUDGES MEMORANDUM
THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376, was en-
acted in 1972 and amended in 1977 and 1987. Its primary pur-
pose is to establish uniform national end-of-the pipe effluent
limitations for the most commonly discharged pollutants. Ba-
sically the Act provides for a floor of federal standards based
on technological capability. Additional treatment is required
if necessary to achieve water quality standards assigned to the
receiving waters by the state. State water quality standards
must meet a variety of federal requirements. States may have
more stringent requirements of either a technological or water
quality nature. The Act contains a federally controlled permit
program to enforce these national standards.
THE NPDES PERMIT
Under section 301(a) of the Act, it is unlawful to dis-
charge a pollutant from a point source without a permit. Sec-
tion 402 contains the mechanism which implements this man-
date, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit program. The NPDES permit program es-
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tablishes specific levels of performance that the discharger
must maintain and requires the discharger to monitor its own
compliance with those levels.
Technology Based Standards. A small number of pollu-
tant parameters form the basis of the technology based efflu-
ent limitations. Included are biochemical oxygen demand
(BOD), total suspended solids (TSS), pH, fecal coliform bac-
teria, oil and grease, cyanide, various metals, phenols (an or-
ganic chemical pollutant), and chemical oxygen demand.
Section 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b), provides for the es-
tablishment of nationally applicable technology based effluent
limitations on an industry by industry basis. The first, and
least stringent, is the Best Practicable Technology (BPT) ef-
fluent limitation required by section 304(b)(1). BPT requires
that a treatment technology be determined for each industrial
class, based on the best technology in use at the time the
guidelines were developed. BPT, to have been in place by
1977, required that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) use a cost benefit balancing test in setting BPT efflu-
ent limitations, taking such engineering factors as the age of
the equipment and facilities involved, the process used, and
non-water quality environmental impacts into consideration.
The second level of control, Best Available Control Tech-
nology (BAT), section 304(b)(2), is more restrictive than BPT,
and was designed to be in place by 1983. BAT requires dis-
chargers to use the best available technology economically
achievable. Contained within BAT guidelines are limitations
for four different classes of pollutants: conventional pollu-
tants, which includes BOD, suspended solids, pH, fecal
coliform bacteria, and oil and grease; toxic pollutants; uncon-
ventional pollutants, such as ammonia, chlorides, nitrates,
iron, and color; and heat.
BAT, defined as the "very best control and treatment
measures that have been or are capable of being achieved,"
allows in-plant process changes as well as end-of-the-pipe
treatment measures to be used in determining BAT limita-
tions. Though BAT also requires EPA to consider the cost of
achieving the effluent reduction, there is no requirement that
cost be balanced against the effluent reduction. The conven-
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tional pollutants were the primary focus of BAT limitations
prior to 1977.
Best Conventional Technology (BCT), section 304(b)(4),
effluent limitations, adopted on an industry by industry basis,
were to have been in place by 1984. The conventional pollu-
tants were specifically excluded from BAT in the 1977 amend-
ments and made subject to BCT treatment standard. BCT ef-
fluent limitations were to be adopted based on a balance
between the cost of attaining a reduction in effluents and the
effluent reduction benefits which would result.
Water Quality Standards. Water quality standards are
simple in concept. A state classifies a water body or a portion
of a stream or river consistent with the use or uses for which
it is to be maintained. The classification scheme typically
breaks down use into several categories: drinking water qual-
ity; water that is fishable and swimmable; water that is mod-
erately degraded by industrial and municipal waste but still
able to support some aquatic life; and water that is an open
sewer.
In addition to use classification, states also set water
qualtiy criteria. The criteria specify the pollutant level in the
water body itself, unlike technology based effluent limitations
which specify the pollutant limits of the discharge. Basically,
these criteria represent the levels of different pollutants a
water body can tolerate while assuring that its designated use
will be maintained. For example, a water body to be used as a
cold water fishery (trout) may require a dissolved oxygen level
of 5.0 part per million (ppm), while a water body to be used as
a warm water fishery (bass) may require a level of 4.0 ppm.
Water quality based limitations, in addition to technology
based effluent limitations discussed above, may be imposed.
Technology based limits are end-of-the-pipe numerical limita-
tions, applicable to all point sources. Water quality based lim-
its may be imposed as additional, more stringent, conditions
when the discharge causes the water quality standards of the
receiving water body to be violated.
Both water quality standards and water quality related
effluent limitations may require levels of treatment considera-
bly higher than those required by the technology based efflu-
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ent limits.
State Certification. Under section 401 of the Act, states
are empowered to certify that federally licensed activities are
in compliance with state laws and regulations and the Clean
Water Act. The provision requires that every applicant for a
federal permit, e.g., an EPA issued NPDES permit, which
may result in any discharge to navigable waters is to provide
the permitting agency certification from the state in which the
discharge originates that any discharge will comply with the
law. Such a certification, unless waived by the states, becomes
a condition to the issuance of the federal permit. The federal
NPDES permit must include any effluent limitation required
in the state certification. A state's certification may require
more stringent effluent limitations than are required under
the Clean Water Act.
Permit Conditions. The core of a permit is the effluent
limitations, usually expressed in single numbers or ranges for
each pollutant parameter. Effluent limitations do not have to
be in numerical form. Water quality criteria may be narrative
in form, such as a requirement that a water body will not be
toxic to the indigenous biota, or based on bioassay results,
such as the requirement that a 10% concentration of toxic
materials in the treated effluent not kill more than 50% of a
test species in a 96 hour bioassay.
EPA developed several different levels of technology
based effluent guidelines designed to implement the require-
ments of the Clean Water Act. The guidelines began with the
least restrictive limitations, becoming more restrictive over
time, to achieve the national goal of eliminating the discharge
of all pollutants.
All NPDES permits, whether issued by EPA or a state
agency, contain standard conditions which are not waivable or
modifiable. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41. These conditions include en-
forcement provisions, procedural requirements, and substan-
tive requirements.
The requirement that each permittee self-monitor and
maintain discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) is a standard
permit condition.
Upset and bypass provisions are also standard. An upset
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is an exceedence that is unintentional and temporary, due to
factors beyond the control of the permittee. A bypass is an
intentional diversion. Unavoidable exceedences are dealt with
through enforcement rather than included as a substantive
provision of a permit.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Section 509(b) contains the authority for judicial review
of rulemaking in the courts of appeals. The grant of authority
is broad, and available to "any interested person." The public
is also allowed to participate when EPA issues permits under
section 402.
The Clean Water Act also contains a provision which au-
thorizes citizens to function as public attorneys general. Sec-
tion 505 allows a citizen to commence a civil action on the
citizens' own behalf against any person alleged to be in viola-
tion of an effluent limitation or standard.
There are several defenses to citizen suits. The upset de-
fense, 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n), allows permittees to raise upset
as an affirmative defense to an enforcement action. An upset
occurs when a permit limitation is exceeded because of excep-
tional circumstances beyond the control of the discharger.
Defendants have also argued that their violations were de
minimis, that the violations were authorized by administrative
waivers, or that governmental enforcement authorities have
tolerated their violations. The construction of permit terms
has also been used to defend against citizen suits.
Section 505 authorizes both injunctive relief and civil
penalties available under section 309(d). Costs and reasonable
attorneys fees may also be awarded under section 505(d). The
majority of citizen plaintiffs seek to either compel defendants
to install equipment to adequately treat the effluent or to in-
stitute procedures which will prevent or minimize future
violations.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Permits. Acme operates an organic chemical manu-
facturing facility which discharges wastewater into the
1989]
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Fairwater River. Acme has had two EPA issued permits, the
first issued in 1974 and the second in 1987. The 1974 permit
contained effluent limitations for the discharge of biochemical
oxygen demand (BOD), total suspended solids (TSS), and pH.
The 1987 permit raised the effluent limits for BOD and TSS
over the limits in the 1974 permit, added toxicity as a new
permit condition, but left the pH limitation the same as the
1974 permit. The toxicity limit was added in 1987 because the
state of New Union required the limitation as necessary to
meet its water quality standards.
There are two pending challenges before the EPA to the
1987 permit. Acme challenged the toxicity limitation, and Na-
tional Council for the Protection of the Environment (NCPE),
a citizen group, challenged the higher BOD and TSS effluent
limitations as violative of section 402(o), the newly enacted
anti-backsliding provision.
The Permit Violations. Acme has violated all of its per-
mit limitations, under both the 1974 and 1987 permits. Acme
routinely violated the pH limitation of the 1974 permit before
1985. But in 1985, Acme changed its pH treatment system
from a manual addition of lime to a mechanized, computer-
operated lime addition system. Since then, it has only had one
pH violation, and that was due to a power outage.
Acme treats organic pollutants with a biological treat-
ment system which uses bacteria to break down the organic
pollutants in the wastewater. Using this treatment system,
Acme has never consistently met BOD and TSS limitations
under the 1974 permit, though its performance has improved
as a result of modifications in its manufacturing process. How-
ever, Acme has been successful in meeting the new higher
BOD and TSS limitations of the 1987 permit, with the excep-
tion of a two week period every winter when extreme cold
causes the biological activity in the treatment system to
diminish.
Acme has violated the toxicity limitation, added in the
1987, permit numerous times. Though Acme's performance
has improved to the point where the effluent regularly results
in 50-60% mortality as determined by a bioassay, the permit
limit is 50% mortality. Acme is able to maintain a 50-60%
[Vol. 6
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mortality rate during most of the year except during a two
week period of extreme cold weather each winter.
Acme's permit requires that BOD and TSS be sampled
and analyzed daily, and pH continuously. Toxicity must be
tested once a month. Acme must report the results monthly to
the EPA on a Discharge Monitoring Report (DMR), which is
on file at the EPA regional office. DMRs are public
information.
NCPE bases its notice of violations and complaint on the
violations reported by Acme in its DMRs. NCPE's complaint
did not allege violations of the toxicity limitation, because the
permit containing the limitation had not been issued when
the complaint was filed. NCPE has subsequently moved to
amend its complaint to include toxicity limitation violations,
and the motion was granted. NCPE contends that the viola-
tions reported constitute admissions for the purpose of sup-
porting its motion for summary judgment that Acme has and
continues to violate the Act.
ISSUE ANALYSIS
Issue A. (1) Mootness. Section 505 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, permits any citizen to commence a civil
action against any person alleged to be in violation of an efflu-
ent standard or limitation under the Act. The Supreme Court
in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), interpreted the phrase "to be in
violation" and held that section 505 does not confer federal
jurisdiction over citizen suits for only wholly past violations.
However, section 505 does confer jurisdiction based on good-
faith allegations of continuous or intermittent violations. The
Fourth Circuit on remand gave two methods that citizen-
plaintiffs may demonstrate an on-going violation; by proving
violations that continue on or after the date the complaint is
filed or by adducing evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could find a continuing likelihood of recurrence in inter-
mittent or sporadic violations. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.
1988). On remand, the district court in Gwaltney held that
1989]
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repeated wintertime violations of a permit limitation, where
there was no degree of certainty that the risk of continued
violations had been eradicated, constituted an on-going viola-
tion. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Va. 1988).
Though Gwaltney precludes citizens suits when violations
have ceased, it leaves several questions unanswered, and pro-
vides the basis for the competitors arguments. What types of
violations are sufficient to overcome the jurisdictional con-
straints of citizen suits based on wholly past violations? Can
citizens maintain an action for violations which are likely to
recur? For those which occur intermittently? What facts are
sufficient to support the argument that the violation is likely
to recur? Or that the violation occurs intermittently? When a
treatment system is updated and the limitation is violated
once, can citizens sue on the violations which occurred under
the old treatment system as well as the one which occurred
under the new?
(2) The pH violations. NCPE includes several types of
violations in its suit against Acme. All pH violations with one
exception occurred when lime was added manually to the ef-
fluent, the old treatment method. After Acme installed a
mechanized computer-operated lime addition system in 1985,
the pH limitation was violated only once, as a result of a
power outage. The pre-1985 pattern of pH violations was due
to operator error during manual treatment. The one violation
which has occurred under the new treatment system was from
a different cause - a power outage. The question is whether
one violation caused by a power outage constituted a continu-
ing or intermittent violation of the old violation? Is there any
reason to believe that violations because of the power outage
will continue? Can a citizens group include permit violations
caused by a treatment system no longer in use in its suit?
(3) The BOD and TSS Violations. Acme routinely vio-
lated the BOD and TSS limitations of the 1974 permit which
remained in effect until the new permit containing higher
BOD and TSS limits was issued in 1987. Acme's performance
has improved such that it no longer routinely violates these
parameters. In 1986 and 1987 violations occurred only during
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a two week period when extremely cold weather interfered
with the biological activity of the treatment system. Had the
new permit conditions been in effect in 1986 (when NCPE's
complaint was filed) Acme would not have violated its permit,
except during that two week period of extreme cold weather
each winter. The issue is whether violations of BOD and TSS
which occur for two weeks every winter constitute continuing
or intermittent violations under Gwaltney?
A single violation which has not recurred would not be a
continuing violation, especially when caused by a power out-
age. Violations which are likely to occur for a two week period
every year because of predictable weather conditions would
likely be considered an intermittent violation and capable of
supporting a citizen suit. Continuing violations may be in-
ferred from past violations when there is no intervening reme-
dial action. However, case law does not yet address these
issues.
(4) The Toxicity Violations. NCPE amended its com-
plaint to include violations of the toxicity limitation. Acme
has never met this effluent limitation and continues to violate
it, though the degree of violation has decreased.
If two permit limitations (BOD and TSS) cease to be vio-
lated (because of the new higher permit limitation), but one
continues (toxicity), may the BOD and TSS violations which
have ceased be included in a suit for the violations of the tox-
icity limitation?
An analysis should consider the likelihood of recurrence,
the frequency of recurrence, the circumstances in which the
violations occur, and actions taken by the permit holder to
prevent future violations. In addition, consider whether the
treatment systems for the various pollutants are interrelated.
Does the treatment of each pollutant, pH, BOD, TSS, or toxic
chemicals, depend on a separate treatment system, or are they
treated by different parts of the same system?
Acme treats the pH of its effluent in a separate treatment
system from the other pollutants. BOD and TSS treatments
are interrelated; both are treated by the biological treatment
system. TSS is further treated by flocculation. An analysis of
the interrelation between pollutants and treatment systems
1989]
9
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
may be used to determine if a permit limitation continues to
be violated. If a BOD violation indicates that the treatment
system for BOD and TSS is not working properly, previous
TSS violations may continue. But this analysis does not hold
for pH and BOD violations since a different treatment system
is used for pH. A pH violation would not constitute a TSS or
BOD violation.
Can violations of a permit be wiped out by lessening the
permit limitation instead of upgrading the treatment of pollu-
tants? When a permit limitation is increased, are those viola-
tions which occurred before the permit change considered to
be wholly past violations? If the 1987 permit is valid and
Acme has never violated the new permit, arguably those viola-
tions which occurred under the old permit would be "wholly
past violations." As a result, NCPE would not be able to
maintain its action based on those violations.
The newly enacted section 402(o), an anti-backsliding
provision, states that a NPDES permit may not be renewed,
reissued, or modified to contain effluent limitations less strin-
gent than the limitations in the previous permit. Does EPA
have the authority to issue a permit containing limitations
greater than those in the expired permit? Does theissuing of
a new permit with limitations greater than those in the old
permit violate section 402(o)? If the higher BOD and TSS ef-
fluent limitations in the new permit violated section 402(o),
are the old limitations of the 1974 permit now in effect?
Section 402(k) states that compliance with a section 402
NPDES permit is, for the purposes of sections 309 and 505,
deemed to be compliance. Under the 1974 permit, Acme con-
tinually violated the BOD and TSS limitations. But the newly
issued 1987 permit raised these limitations with the result
that Acme no longer violates these conditions. The violations
ceased not because Acme initiated a new, more effective treat-
ment system but because the permit limitations were raised,
perhaps illegally. If the 1987 permit limitations are valid,
Acme is in compliance with three of the four parameters, with
the exception of a two week violation of BOD and TSS during
the winter. However, if the 1987 permit violates the anti-deg-
radation provision and the 1974 permit limitations are still
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valid, Acme is violating both the BOD and TSS limitations.
Can NCPE challenge the new permit conditions in this
proceeding or is it barred by section 509? Section 509 provides
for review of the Administrator's actions in promulgating any
effluent standard in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. An ar-
gument for allowing NCPE to maintain its suit in the district
court is to avoid a bifurcated system which can lead to delays
in resolving disputes, and to preserve judicial resources. See
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980).
Nevertheless, NCPE is challenging the BOD and TSS ef-
fluent limitations administratively. When a permit condition
is challenged, the effect of the contested provision is stayed
and cannot be subject to judicial review until the EPA has
taken final action on the challenge. All other permit provi-
sions remain fully effective and enforceable. 40 C.F.R. §
124.16. Thus, as the old permit containing the lower BOD and
TSS limits remains in effect until the EPA has taken final ac-
tion on NCPE's challenge, Acme continues to violate those
conditions, conditions which it never met consistently under
the old permit, and NCPE can maintain its suit for the BOD
and TSS violations. Therefore, the district court erred in
granting Acme's motion for summary judgment as to these
violations.
Issue B. The Validity of the Toxicity Limitation. What is
the effect of Acme's administrative challenge of the toxicity
limitation? Does the challenged permit remain in effect or
does the old permit continue in force? Acme is challenging the
toxicity limitation administratively in the same proceeding
that NCPE is challenging the new BOD and TSS limits.
Under 40 C.F.R. § 124.16, the effect of the challenged provi-
sion is stayed, and the pH and old BOD and TSS permit limi-
tations remain in effect and enforceable. Thus, NCPE cannot
maintain its suit as to the toxicity violations. The stayed por-
tions are not subject to judicial review until the EPA has
taken final action on Acme's and NCPE's challenges.
Once the EPA has taken final action on the administra-
tive challenges to the permit, what is the proper forum to
challenge a permit toxicity limitation? Is the proper forum the
court of appeals under section 509? Or is the district court the
1989]
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proper forum?
Judicial review of the EPA's actions is governed by sec-
tion 509(b). Under section 509, the circuit courts of appeal
have exclusive jurisdiction over permit reviews. District courts
have jurisdiction over citizen suits (section 505) and the EPA
enforcement of permits (section 309).
If the toxicity limitation is valid and NCPE is successful
in maintaining its suit for toxicity violations, does the district
court have jurisdiction to assess penalties for toxicity viola-
tions? Section 505 gives the district court the authority to ap-
ply any appropriate civil penalties under section 309(d) for vi-
olations of effluent limitations, and under section 309(d), civil
penalties may not exceed $25,000 per day for each violation.
Additional Issues. The district court opinion contains
several tangential issues that were not addressed in the ap-
peal. What is the proper forum to challenge a section 401
state certification? Do the federal courts have jurisdiction
over a challenge to the certification where state courts do not?
If the federal courts have jurisdiction, is the circuit court of
appeals or the district court the proper forum? If neither the
federal courts or the state courts have jurisdiction, can a tox-
icity limitation go into a permit without any review
whatsoever?
The new permit contains a toxicity limitation which pro-
vides that "the discharge shall not be toxic to the indigenous
biota of the Fairwater River." Does the use of brine shrimp, a
saltwater organism not native to fresh water, as the test or-
ganism to determine the toxicity of Acme's wastewater violate
this condition?
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